わかりやすい沖縄基地問題

もっと知っておきたい沖縄のこと

沖縄のホークミサイル基地

 

 

渡嘉敷島のホークミサイル基地


1960年3月8日 渡嘉敷村へホークミサイル基地建設の告知、3月22日米民政府より土地収用宣告、接収命令が出される。渡嘉敷の西山にあった白玉之塔の慰霊碑 (住民368名、日本軍人76名、軍属87名、防衛隊41名)は移設され、山が大きく削られ造成された。

1962年6月1日 基地完成。約250人の米兵駐留
1969年8月2日 基地閉鎖(閉鎖後も米軍管理下に置かれる)
1972年5月15日 沖縄返還を記念し「国立沖縄青年の家」設置

 

Army missile units stay ready to defend skies over Okinawa - News - Stripes

By FRANK HAMSKI | Stars and Stripes | Published: January 17, 1968

f:id:neverforget1945:20200918132307p:plain

A Nike-Hercules launch crew races for its missile during an annual firing practice on Okinawa in January, 1968. EIKOH GOYA/STARS AND STRIPES

 

The big Nike-Hercules roared off its launching pad and into the Okinawa sky to signal the opening of the annual missile firing practice of the Army's 30th Arty. Brigade.

The 30th will fire Nike-Hercules and Hawk missiles until Feb. 28 to test the effectiveness and training of each of its batteries, scattered throughout Okinawa and on the offshore island of Tokashiki.

Nike-Hercules and Hawk missiles provide a protective missile umbrella over Okinawa. The brigade shares responsibility with the Air Force's 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the air defense of the Ryukyus.

The Nike-Hercules is a solid-propellant missile which succeeded the Nike-Ajax as workhorse of the Army's air defense system. With its booster it is 39 feet long and 31½ inches in diameter. It weighs more than 10,000 pounds.

It is directed to its target through ground-based guidance as opposed to the Hawk, which has an internal guidance system.

The Nike-Hercules has scored kills up to 150,000 feet at targets travelling more than 2,000 miles an hour. It can reach a target more than 75 miles away. It can either knock out a single aircraft or a whole flight.

This year the Firebee Towbee, a jet drone, made its debut as the target for the Hawk, a 17-foot-long, solid-fuel missile. The 22-foot Firebee is a pilotless target plane that can make sudden dives and turns from command impulses on the ground.

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Sgt. Jimmie Bradshaw raises a Nike-Hercules missile into firing position.
EIKOH GOYA/STARS AND STRIPES

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Staff Sgt. Donald Ziegelbaver, left, plots the missile's course toward an ''unidentified object" as Lt. Wayne Tokiwa, Spec. 5 Allan Imhoff and Staff Sgt. Robert Blount man the controls. Standing at center is the chief evaluator, Maj. Herbert Siegel.
EIKOH GOYA/STARS AND STRIPES

f:id:neverforget1945:20200918132823p:plain

Spec. 4 William Lee, front, and Pfc. Reynold Felix, Nike-Hercules target simulator operators, are watched by Sfc. Joseph Karas.
EIKOH GOYA/STARS AND STRIPES

 

f:id:neverforget1945:20200918132856p:plain

The missile leaves its launcher.
EIKOH GOYA/STARS AND STRIPES

 

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0375/1684235.pdf

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Honorable David M. Kennedy Ambassador at Large Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear David:

I am pleased to learn from your letter of February 3, 1971, that there is no misunderstanding with the Japanese Government, and that the GOJ intends to meet its commitment on the $200 million. As far as I am concerned, we currently have an acceptable agreement on $150 million of the total $200 million. Each separate aspect of the package is discussed briefly below.

The GOJ willingness to pay $100 million in cash over a five year period obviously meets the requirement of being a net financial benefit and is acceptable to Defense.

The GOJ proposal for settling $50 million of the $200 million as cash for the purchase of Nike and Hawk missiles ($20 million) and for the relocation of the Machinato housing area ($30 million) does not meet the basic criterion of being a net financial benefit to DOD. The Nike and Hawk missiles are valuable equipment, and their possible sale to the GOJ is considered by us as a separate financial transaction. The GOJ is under no obligation to purchase this air defense equipment if they can meet the responsibility of providing for the air defense of Okinawa within one year following reversion through other means. Our willingness to sell this equipment results from a desire to facilitate the GOJ assumption of this defense responsibility. As has been stated a number of times previously, the Defense Department also does not consider the relocation of existing housing assets as representing a net financial benefit. Furthermore, we assume that any discussion DCM Sneider had with the Japanese on this subject was informal and did not represent a formal commitment by the US Government. Since we are not prepared to accept this $50 million of the GOJ offer, I would recommend that a counter proposal be made to the GOJ where in this $50 million would be settled by GOJ contributions to costs arising under the Master Labor Contract, including the US obligation for severance pay. (It should be noted that the magnitude of the US obligation for severance pay is dependent to a great extent on any reductions after reversion.) DOD would prefer to have the GOJ meet this $50 million segment of the $200 million commitment in the labor cost area since it would be more eas appears to us that the GOJ could justify this $50 million to the Diet on

the basis of increased labor costs to the US as a result of reversion. However, if this is unacceptable to the GOJ, we would be prepared to accept this entire an:ount, or any balance of this amount, if required through (1) COJ financing of O&M costs in Japan and Okinawa, e.g., utilities, etc; and (2) additional DOD required facilities maintenance, repair and inprovements in Japan and Okinawa, provided that it is understood that the justification for neither of these two items can be directly related to reversion. I am prepared to agree to negotiating instructions for Mr. Jurich which would reflect either of the above alternatives.

I assume that the remaining $50 million of the $200 million consists of (1) the GOJ commitment to provide $40 million for facilities maintenance, repair and improvement expenditures in Japan and Okinawa and (2) $10 million in savings to us by the reduction or elimination of the US share of the cost of administering the Master Labor Contract. Item (1) is acceptable to us as long as it is clearly understood that facilities expenditures are not necessarily new construction and that not all of the other work we do on the facilities with these funds will be directly related to reversion. If this is clearly unde cs tood by the God, then what is needed now is general agreement on a simple procedure whereby contracts we will undertake with various Japanese and Okinawan firms can be presented for payment by the GOJ through a central authority without further justification for the individual work. In this regard, we would no: desire or expect the GOJ to become involved in any way in the requirements, design, supervision or contract administration for the facilities work to be paid for by the GOJ. Whatever anount of the additional $50 million discussed above would eventually be used for maintenance, repair and improvements of facilities in Okinawa and Japan would also be governed by these provisions. My staff is prepared to discuss with your staff specific details of such an arrangement.

With respect to item (2) above relating to savings accruing to the US in connection with administration of the Master Labor Contract, it should be clearly understood that the $10 million would not be applied to any savings in administrative costs to the US which may result from a change in the administrative fee formula under consideration in concurrent negotiations, but only to that portion of the cost of administering the indirect hire system which the US will be obligated to pay under any revised formula. It should also be noted that the estimated $10 million is based on the assumption of a relatively stable labor force. Therefore, if the sum of $10 million cannot be reached due to a reduced labor force, the difference should be financed by the GOJ through payment of other DOD costs arising under the Master Labor Contract, or O&M type costs or DOD required facilities maintenance, repair and improvements in Japan and Okinawa. On this basis, . DOD would agree to inclusion of this item.

Sincerely,

 

 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Letter From Ambassador Kennedy on Okinawa Reversion

Financial Negotiations

A proposed letter from you to Ambassador Kennedy, replying to his letter of February 3, 1971, is ücacheá for your signature.

I as well as the PDASD/ Comptroller (MY, Brazier), PDASD/I&L (Mr. Gibson), and ASD/M&RA (M. Keiy; recommend signature.

 

 

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibility for Okinawa (U)

REFERENCES: (a) JCSM 522-70, dated November 12, 1970

(b) Joint State/Defense Message 110102, DTG 101840 July

1970 (c) JCSM 297-70, dated June 18, 1970

In the Chairman's memorandum to me of November 12, 1970, reference (a), he forwarded a plan for transferring to the GOJ certain areas of U.S. military facilities on Okinawa in order to permit the GOJ to assume responsibility for the defense of Okinawa after reversion.

Afte carefully reviewing his plan and recornmendations, I have decided that he U.S. military controlled land and facilities, as specifically described in the enclosures 3 through 5 to this memorandum, are approved for release to the GOJ at the time of or following reversion. The areas specifically involved are: White Beach, Nana Wheel, and Naha Air Base. The White Beach area only involves the release of land. The Naha Wheel area was previously approved for negotiations for release to the GOJ by reference (b), based upon the negligible costs and other insignificant impact involved as stated in reference (c). Should a decision be made to return the Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade to Okinawa, it is recognized that additional facilities may be required, in part, because of the release of the Naha Wheel area. These facility requirements will be addressed as a separate subject should a recommendation to return the Brigade to Okinawa be forwarded for approval. The approved release of the Wo areas is as recommended by reference (a) and is depicted in eclores 4 and 5. While preliminary estimates prior to decisions on base a ignments and reductions in December 1970 indicated that there might here been a possibility of releasing permanent community support iacillies (dormitories, BOQ's, etc.) at Naha Air Base to the GOJ, I have now determined that this cannot be done since all such facilities are required for the support of U.S. forces on Okinawa. Detailed information on the facilities at Naha Air Base required by the U.S. forces, approved for release to the CO and to be jointly used, is included at enclosure 2 and 3.

FORA

 

In addition, the following guidance - along with the more detailed policy guidance on property attached as enclosurel - will be observed in negotiating the release of the land and facilities with the GOJ and in regard to maintenance of the land and facilities until released to the GOJ:

  1. The Service currently responsible for maintaining the facilities to be released will continue to do so according to current standards until formal transfer is made to the GOJ. Our negotiating position with the GOJ is that transfer should be effected as quickly as possible after reversion to keep U.S. maintenance costs to a minimum. Where a particular Service intends to vacate the facilities considerably before reversion, our regotiators should seek GOJ financial compensation for U.S. costs incurred during the period between cessation of use by U.S. units and formal transfer to the GOJ, if at all possible.
  2. As regards Naha Air Base, the U.S. negotiating position is that the GOJ should assume operation of the Air Base, with the residual Navy units as tenants, as soon after reversion as possible under an appro. priate joint use and cost sharing arrangement. Furthermore, we are prepared to shift the Navy section of the flight line area as described in enclosure 2 should the GOJ request additional space for civilian airline operations. Authority to propose either the Navy's alternativelor final fall back position to the GOJ should be requested of Washington if this is required. Also, we are prepared to release an area shown under Air Force control on enclosure 3G in the vicinity of Arnold Drive should this land and qucnset type buildings be needed by the GOJ.

In the Chairman's memorandum and its attached plan, a number of references were made to required relocations of facilities on Okinawa and the need for the GOJ to fund these relocations. This is a complex subject involving other reversion negotiations with the GOJ; the following statement of my position should clarify the matter.

Although negotiations on the economic/financial aspects of reversion continue with the GOJ, it is my understanding that the GOJ has agreed to compensate the U.S. for the residual value of U.S. military facilities on Okidawa by providing, over five years, $200 million in agreed goods and services. Consequently, the goods and services received from the GOJ under this agreement must be such as to represent a net financial benefit to DoD and thus, in turn, to the USG. This, in effect, means that the

agreed goods ard services will be used to offset DoD budget costs. The basic criterion of acceptability will, therefore, be whether or not we would have purchased the goods or services with appropriated funds. Furthermore, it should be noted that the payment period for the GOJ is the five years following reversion, and, therefore, no goods or services will be available until FY 73. In addition, it is intended that Congressional authorization be obtained for all military construction projects to be financed by the GOJ. Accordingly, requirements for new military construction on Okinawa, whether or not these result directly from reversion, should be processed, reviewed and submitted by the Services as part of their no..mal FY 73 military construction program. For FY 73 and later, the decision as to the method of funding of approved projectsappropriated funds or as GOJ provided compensation will be made in accordance with the terms of the final agree nent with the GOJ.

Enclosure

 

 

DOD negotiating position fox facilities at Neha Air Base, Naha Wheel Area, and White Beach, Okinawas to be used by U, S, Forces and JSDP Forces after Okinawa Reversion.

Enclosure I

Policy Guidance on Property

Enclosure 2

Navy Nana Air Base Fligh Line Facilities Fall Eack Positions Explanation

Enclosure 3

Naha Air Base

3A

Color Coded Site Pian of Current Utilization of Naha nic Ease

3B

Naha Air Base Current Land Use

30

Air Force - Naha Air Base Current Use Facility List (Also Color Coded to Show Use of Facilities after Reversion Keyed to Enclosure 3G)

Anny - Naia Air Base Current Use Facility List (Sans List Epplies foi & Use of Facilities after Reversion Keyed to Enclosure 36)

3E

Navy - Naha Air Base Current Use Fecility List

3F

Navy - Naha Air Base - List of Facilities to be Retained by Navy after Reversion (Keyed to Enclosure 3G)

30

Color Coded Site Plan for Naha Air Base Use afler Reversion

31

Nahe Air Base Approximate Land Use after Reversion Based on Enclosure 36 Plan

31

Color Coded Site Plan for Nala Air Base Indicating Navy Alternative I Fall Back Position on Flight Lina Decility Isse Tith Colete list of Facilities to be Retained by Navy

 

Enclosure 3J

Color Coded Sit Plan for Naha Air Base Indicating Navy Alternative 2 (Least Desired) Fall Back Position on Flight Line Facility Issue

Enclosure 4

Naha Wheel Area

44

List of l'acilities to be Released to the JSDE at Army Controlled Naha Wiesl Area

Site Plan of Naha Wheel Area

Enclosure

White Beach Area

5A

List of Naval Facilities at White Beach

5B

Site of White Beach Annotating Area to be Released to JSDE

In reply refer to: I-22180/71

ONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibility for

Okinawa (U)

In the November, 1969 Joint Communique issued by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato, Japan agreed to assume gradually responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa after reversion. On November 12, 1969, the JCS submitted their recommendations to you on the US military land and facilities on Okinawa which could be released to the GOJ to facilitate its assumption of this defense responsibility.

The attached memorandum to the Service Secretaries and the Chairman, JCS, and its extensive enclosures, replies to the JCSM and provides other guidance on this subject.

I and the ASD/I&L (Mr. Gibson) recommend signature.

 

 

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0375/1684234.pdf

DECLASSIFIED

L.O. 12953 SEC. 3.8 OSOW /a No Q

uirlo m. 0-0,2

l /azlog

FEB - 3 1971

Dear Mel:

As I mentioned in my letter of January 23, 1971, to you, Tony Jurich and I met with Japanese negotiators Vice Minister of Finance Yusuke Kashiwagi and Counsellor Tarao Maeda on the financial settlement involving the reversion of Okinawa. I outline in this letter those elements in our discussions with the Japanese which require further study and decisions by you, Secretary Rogers, or myself.

We are convinced, as a result of these discussions, that one of the main concerns of the Japanese involves the search for constitutional or statutory authority to carry out the terms of the Jurich-Kashiwagi Memorandum of Understanding. Vice Minister Kashiwagi reaffirmed the determination of the Japanese Government to meet its commitment regarding the Memorandum of Understanding and especially the $200 million. The Japanese preference for funding relocation-type items under the $200 million figure is associated with the existence of legal authority to justify this kind of budgetary outlay. Kashiwagi explicitly stated, however, that the Japanese recognize that this mode of payment would not meet Defense Department requirements. He concluded that in order for the two governments to reach a mutually satisfactory solution of the $200 million transfer problem, the Government of Japan would have to obtain additional legal authority. Vice Minister Kashiwagi therefore suggested that, in addition to other transfers, the Japanese pay up to $100 million in cash over a five-year period to the Department of Defense. He believed that a suitable clause would have to be included in the treaty documents authorizing payment to the United States with some accompanying rationale. We agreed that each side would, as a matter of urgency, study the feasibility of including such a clause in the draft treaty.

Among the other possibilities for transfer payments Ciscussed, the Japanese insisted we consider two items

1. $20 million in cast for the purchase of Nike-Hawk missiles, and,

2. $30 million for the relocation of Machinato Housing

We, of course, said both of these proposals were unacceptable since they did not seem to come within the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding Vice Minister Kashiwagi informed us, however, that in December 1970 Minister Sneider, the special representative for Okinawan negotiations, had suggested to the Japanese Foreign Office a list of items for the $200 mil.on settlement. This list included $30 million for the relocation of Machinato Housing. Consequently, the Japanese felt that the U.S. Coveroment had implicitly reached a political decision to meet the Japanese request about the relocation of Machinato Housing. Minister Kasihiwagi said the Foreign Minister strongly believed that relocation of this housing complex is necessary, since its relocation would serve as a visible symbol of Japan's resumption of sovereignty over Okinawa. Kashiwagi also noted that such relocation would help the Japanese in other ways, particularly as regards juscifying to the Okinawans the GOJ purchase of the civil assets.

Since the Government of Japan seems to be as determined as we are to reach full agreement on the financial settlement terms of Okinawa reversion, I agreed to Vice Minister Kashiwagi's proposal that he and Tony Jurich meet again in Tokyo on February 17. I am hopeful that by that time the interested agencies can reach coordinated positions on: (1) the inclusion of suitable language in the draft tr.ty to cover the cash payment portion of the $200 million item, eicher explicitly or by implication; (2) the Japanese requt for a political determination about the relocation of Machinato Housing which will be conveyed through diplomatic channels; and (3) the Japanese request that the Nike-Ilawk Purchase be included within the terms of the $200 million cransfer.

We have received assurances from the OMB staff rogarding the procedures wlierely DOD realizes a net budgetary benefit from cash payments under the $200 million settlement figure. I am infomed the DOD comptroller staff members have also discussed this matter with OMB.

I am hopeful we can promptly work out arrangements which are beneficial and positically aclvantageous to the United States as well as to the Government of Japan. In the near future, I plan to discuss the financial settlement with Minister of Finance Fukuda with a view of making the settlement arrangements definitive.

I am sending a similar letter to Secretary of State Rogers.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Melvin R. Laird

Secretary Department of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301