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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 46 No. 3 (2002)
The Information War in the
Pacific, 1945
Paths to Peace
Josette H. Williams
In August 1945, the world went into a state of shock at the sheer
devastating power of nuclear weapons. Over fifty years later, that shock
still eclipses the fascinating story of how the Japanese nation actually
came to surrender. Many Americans believe that the
surrender immediately followed the use of the atomic bomb. Worse, young
Japanese seem to consider the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be
isolated incidents without cause. Ignorance of the history of August 1945
may turn out to be one of the lamentable legacies of World War II.
There is no question that the Allies’ superior military power and
determined spirit defeated Japan. But it was the Allies’ communication
network that provided war information directly to the Japanese people and
an unprecedented response by the Emperor that pushed Japan to accept
this defeat. What follows is the story of the US Office of War Information
(OWI) and the dramatic role it played in the surrender of the Japanese
empire.

Leaflet used throughout the Pacific islands to promote the voluntary
surrender of Japanese combatants in World War II.
(All documents and photos provided by the author.)
The Office of War Information
The contributions of the Office of War Information at the end of the war in
the Pacific have been cited briefly in many publications, but the full story
has never been told OWI was responsible for using information warfare to
promote distrust of Japanese military leaders, lower Japanese military and
civilian morale, and encourage surrender. Information was disseminated by
radio and leaflet both to the Japanese mainland and to enemy forces
hidden on Allied-occupied Pacific islands.
1
OWI was manned by civilians and supported by military liaison personnel.
The Director, Elmer Davis, reported to Secretary of State James Byrnes.
Policy decisions were subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
coordinated by Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Edward Barrett managed
the Overseas Branch; Bradford Smith was chief of Central Pacific
Operations in Honolulu; and Richard Hubert, the author’s father, headed
the forward area on Saipan.
The communication network was complex. OWI monitored Radio Tokyo
broadcasts through its offices in San Francisco, where they were
summarized and relayed to Washington. Response and new copy were
composed and coded in Washington, then relayed through Honolulu to
OWI’s printing presses and radio station on Saipan. Printed text was
paraphrased to avoid breaking the code.
Saipan, one of the Mariana Islands, had been controlled by Japan since
1918. It was captured by the 2nd and 4th US Marine Divisions and 27th US
Army Division on 7 July 1944 in one of the costliest battles of World War II.
In 29 days of fighting, more than 3,000 US soldiers and almost 30,000
Japanese lost their lives. It was a decisive battle—Saipan’s location, 1,200
miles southeast of Tokyo, put Japan and China within range of Allied
bombers, provided a staging area for invasion of the Japanese homeland,
and allowed direct transmission of radio broadcasts to the Japanese
people.
After securing the island, US forces remained on Saipan, guarding
Japanese prisoners of war, constructing a huge airbase, staging bombing
runs, and supporting the civilian OWI psychological warfare effort. From
Saipan, OWI bombarded Japan with radio messages through its 50,000-
watt standard-wave station on Saipan, Radio KSAI. The station also picked
up 100,000-watt shortwave transmissions from the OWI station in
Honolulu and relayed them to Japan. Japanese language broadcasts
consisted of news on the status of the war, bombing warnings, and
messages from Japanese prisoners of war on Saipan urging surrender.
KSAI radio transmissions served many purposes: to Japan’s civilian
government, they were a vital source of news, received at a time when the
fanaticism of the Japanese militarists denied civilian leaders access to
information about the status of the war; to hidden Japanese soldiers on
occupied Pacific islands, they tempted surrender by promising fair
treatment as prisoners of war; and to Allied flight crews, the around-theclock OWI radio transmissions beamed home the B-29s, saving planes and
lives.2
At the same time, newspapers and leaflets in the Japanese language were
printed on Saipan. From there, Air Force B-29s flying at 20,000 feet
dropped 500-pound M-16 fire bomb containers converted into leaflet
casings. These opened at 4,000 feet to deploy millions of leaflets,
effectively covering a whole Japanese city with information. In just the last
three months of formal psychological warfare, OWIproduced and deployed
over 63 million leaflets informing the Japanese people of the true status of
the war and providing advance warning to35 cities targeted for
destruction. Postwar surveys showed that the Japanese people trusted
the accuracy of the leaflets and many residents of the targeted cities
prepared immediately to leave their homes. The Japanese government
regarded the leaflets with such concern that it ordered the arrest of those
who kept or even read the leaflets and did not turn them in to their local
police stations. Outside Japan, leaflets promoting the surrender of
individual Japanese soldiers and civilians were dropped near cave and
tunnel hideouts on islands that had been captured by the Allies.5
4
3
Allied B-29 bombers pass Mt. Fujiyama on course from Saipan to
deliver OWI leaflets over Japanese cities.
Japan’s Internal Frictions
Japan had two governments in 1945: one was a military government
determined to fight to the last; the other was a civilian government that
had long recognized the need to surrender. The military clearly held the
upper hand, rendering the civilian leaders impotent through political
intimidation and threats of imprisonment.
Civil-military friction, disagreements within political factions, and
intergenerational tensions resulted in a bewildering array of conflicting
reports on current conditions being disseminated to the Japanese people.
The job of the US Office of War information was to cut through the
confusion in Japan and its occupied territories, and to convince the
Emperor, the politicians, and the civilians that victory was already in the
hands of the Allies.
Propaganda leaflet designed like Japanese money to attract attention.
Message on the back links deteriorating purchasing power to the
military's domination of the government.
There is little doubt that Japanese government agencies, military and
civilian alike, realized by mid-summer 1945 that their country could not win
the war. Japan’s cities were being destroyed almost at will. Although
attempting to avoid the Emperor’s palace, the Allies had devastated the
capital in only six hours of bombing on 9-10 March 1945, leaving 100,000
dead and over 1,000,000 homeless, an even worse toll than from the later
atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The Japanese military maintained a defiant
stance, even as they recognized the need to shift from agression to
defense of their homeland. They were well prepared, both psychologically
and technically, for this final stand. The Allies never underestimated (as
we, perhaps, sometimes do today) the desire of Japan’s military leaders to
preserve their honor by fighting literally to the last man, woman, and child.
6
Broadcasting the Surrender Offer
On 26 July 1945, the heads of state of the United States, Great Britain, and
the Soviet Union, meeting in Potsdam, Germany, agreed to give Japan an
opportunity to end the war. Their terms called for the disarmament and
abolition of the Japanese military; elimination of military influence in
political forums; Allied occupation of Japan; liberation of Pacific territories
gained by Japan since 1914; swift justice for war criminals; maintenance of
non-military industries; establishment of freedom of speech, religion and
thought; and introduction of respect for fundamental human rights. The
final section demanded that the government of Japan “proclaim now the
unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces.” The alternative for
Japan was “prompt and utter destruction.”8
7
By 7:00 p.m. on the very day of the Potsdam Proclamation, OWI’s station
KSAI began broadcasting the surrender terms to the Japanese nation at
regular intervals. OWI also printed the full text of the offer in the Japanese
language and dropped over 3 million leaflets by B-29 aircraft. Thus
Japanese officials learned of the Potsdam conditions a day ahead of the
official communication sent through diplomatic channels.
OWI personnel adjusting the KSAI radio transmitter to new frequencies to
avoid jamming by Japan
Japan’s Cabinet and the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War
were immediately called into joint session. They met almost
continually from 26 July through 14 August. Arguments over whether, when,
and under what conditions Japan should surrender continued right
through the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On 27 July, after a
routine meeting not attended by Japan’s civilian Foreign Minister, the
militarists released notification to the world’s media that Japan rejected
the Potsdam offer. 9
Stepped-Up Bombing
By noon on 28 July, OWI’s presses on Saipan were rolling with notices
warning civilians to evacuate 35 Japanese cities scheduled to be bombed
within the next few days. About 1 million leaflets fell on the targeted cities
whose names appeared in Japanese writing under a picture of five
airborne B-29s releasing bombs. Given the extent of the effort, it is
extraordinary that many Americans are not aware that Japanese cities
were warned prior to being bombed. Even today, members of the B-29
crews recall their fears that the warnings would make them easier targets
for Japanese planes and antiaircraft artillery. However, they concurred with
Gen. Curtis LeMay’s proposal at the time. Military newspapers featured
the unprecedented action under such headlines as “B-29 Command Now
Calling Its Shots” and “580 B-29s Follow Up Leaflet Warnings With
3800 Tons Of Fire And Explosives.” Visualize what it must have been like
for people in the targeted cities to look up and see more than 100 B-29
“Superfortresses” overhead. The image lends understanding to the Allies’
decision to warn civilians, even at their own risk.
11
10
Advertising the Destruction of Hiroshima
At 2:45 a.m. on 6 August, the Allies’ B-29 “Enola Gay” left the island of
Tinian near Saipan. Its primary target was Hiroshima, where the 2nd
Japanese Army stood poised to defend against an expected Allied invasion
of their homeland. At 8:15 a.m., the “Enola Gay” destroyed Hiroshima with a
single atomic bomb.
Back on Saipan, the OWI presses were turning out leaflets that revealed
the special nature of Hiroshima’s destruction and predicted similar fates
for more Japanese cities in the absence of immediate acceptance of the
terms of the Potsdam agreement. By 9 August, more than 5 million leaflets
about the atom bomb had been released over major Japanese cities. The
OWI radio station beamed a similar message to Japan every 15 minutes.
Front side of OWI notice #2106, dubbed the “LeMay bombing leaflet,”
which was delivered to Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and 33 other Japanese cities on 1 August 1945.
The Japanese text on the reverse side of the leaflet carried the following
warning: “Read this carefully as it may save your life or the life of a relative
or friend. In the next few days, some or all of the cities named on the
reverse side will be destroyed by American bombs. These cities contain
military installations and workshops or factories which produce military
goods. We are determined to destroy all of the tools of the military clique
which they are using to prolong this useless war. But, unfortunately,
bombs have no eyes. So, in accordance with America's humanitarian
policies, the American Air Force, which does not wish to injure innocent
people, now gives you warning to evacuate the cities named and save your
lives. America is not fighting the Japanese people but is fighting the
military clique which has enslaved the Japanese people. The peace which
America will bring will free the people from the oppression of the military
clique and mean the emergence of a new and better Japan. You can
restore peace by demanding new and good leaders who will end the war.
We cannot promise that only these cities will be among those attacked
but some or all of them will be, so heed this warning and evacuate these
cities immediately.” (See Richard S. R. Hubert, “The OWI Saipan Operation,”
Official Report to US Information Service, Washington, DC 1946.)
Indecision in Tokyo
Japanese officials dispatched scientists and military personnel to
Hiroshima to assess damages from the atomic bomb, but they remained
paralyzed by disagreement over whether to surrender. The Supreme
Council for the Direction of the War, composed of four military and two
civilian members, was deadlocked, unable to present the Cabinet and the
Emperor with its customary unanimous decision. Army Chief of Staff Gen.
Umezo Yoshijir, Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Toyoda Soemu, and War Minister
Gen. Anami Korechika maintained that any surrender agreement had to
guarantee the Emperor’s continued power as sovereign ruler, prevent
occupation of major cities such as Tokyo, and place responsibility for
disarmament and dealing with war criminals in Japan’s own hands. The trio
opposing them (Premier Suzuki Kantar, Foreign Minister Tg Shigenori, and
Navy Minister Adm. Yonai Mitsumasa) viewed the Potsdam agreement as
an ultimatum. In their view, the only negotiable ambiguity was the official
position of the Emperor—the Potsdam agreement had applied the term
“unconditional surrender” exclusively to the enemy’s armed forces.
The Supreme War Direction Council met from 11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on 9
August. The Japanese Cabinet—which included four members of the
Supreme Council—was convened from 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. that night.
Neither meeting proved decisive. The heated argumentation throughout
these meetings must surely have reflected the grim realities around them.
Not only Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but all of Japan’s major cities had been
destroyed, with the exception of the historic temple area of Kyoto. Japan’s
Air Defense General Headquarters reported that out of 206 cities, 44 had
been almost completely wiped out, while 37 others, including Tokyo, had
lost over 30 percent of their built-up areas. Almost 2 million military
personnel and civilians had been killed. Another 8 million were wounded or
homeless. The destruction was so complete, historian Edwin Reischauer
reminds us, that Japan, experiencing total military and industrial defeat for
the first time in its history, took over 10 years to regain its pre-war
productive capacity.13
12
The spreading awareness of the destructive power released at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki increased the urgent atmosphere at these meetings in
Tokyo. Nonetheless, it took an unprecedented action by the Emperor, and
the extraordinary effort of OWI to publicize his action, to break the
Japanese military-civilian deadlock.
Half an hour after the 9 August Cabinet meeting ended, Premier Suzuki
Kantaro and Foreign Minister Tg Shigenori called members of the Cabinet
and the Supreme Council, and Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, President of
Japan’s Privy Council, into an Imperial Conference. For several hours in a
hot, airless bomb shelter, the Emperor listened to the opposing arguments.
His political role usually consisted of passively endorsing Cabinet
decisions. But at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of 10 August, in a deeply
moving speech, Japan’s Emperor Hirohito called upon the power of his
moral and spiritual leadership and directed that Japan should accept the
terms of the Potsdam agreement.
There are indications that the Emperor had long wished for an end to the
war for practical and emotional reasons. Ascending to the throne in 1926
at the age of 25, Hirohito was an intelligent man, a distinguished marine
biologist, and a rather quiet, shy individual. He remained in Tokyo
throughout the war, witnessing personally the destruction that he knew to
be indicative of what was happening to the rest of his country. According
to various historians, he found the arguments of the militarists to be selfseeking and born of false pride. No doubt pressure from the civilian
members of his Cabinet and other government officials strengthened his
resolve to end the devastation.
14
So it was that on 10 August, at 3:00 a.m., the Cabinet and the Supreme
Council complied and voted in reluctant unanimity to accept the Potsdam
offer, but with the stipulation that the Emperor remain the sovereign ruler
of the country. By 7:00 a.m., the Foreign Minister had dispatched an
announcement of the decision to the United States and China through
Japan's Minister Shunichi Kase in Switzerland, and to Great Britain and the
USSR through Minister Suemasa Okamoto in Sweden. Japanese officials
tensely awaited the Allies’ response.
Turmoil in Washington
Washington hotly debated Japan’s request for modification of the Potsdam
accord. Historian Robert Butow details the opposing arguments: one side
was convinced that acceding to Japan’s proviso would inspire prolonged
fighting; the other side held that assuring the Emperor’s continued status
as head of state would strengthen post-war reformation.15
In the end, Secretary of State Byrnes prevailed and prepared the Allied
nations’ reply, stipulating that the Emperor could remain as a sovereign
ruler, but that “from the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor
and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the
Supreme Commander of the Allied powers.” With the concurrence of the
United Kingdom, China, Australia and, ultimately, the USSR, the reply was
forwarded to Japan through Switzerland.16
Getting the Word Out
OWI now played its most dramatic role.
Technically, Japan had not yet surrendered. The war was not yet over.
President Truman had ordered the continuation of Allied bombing runs
over Japanese military installations. The people of Japan knew nothing of
their government’s plan to surrender. Radio Tokyo still exhorted all
Japanese to prepare defenses against an enemy invasion.
In a race to save the lives of soldiers still fighting, the Allies’ acceptance of
Japan’s modification of the Potsdam surrender terms was radioed to OWI
in Honolulu and Saipan at the same time that it was forwarded to
Switzerland. The US War Department sent an urgent dispatch ordering
OWI to inform the Japanese people directly, by leaflet and radio, that their
government had offered to surrender and that the Allies had accepted the
offer. The order, which originated from the White House, threw OWI
personnel into high gear. The text for the message was prepared in
Washington and dictated by telephone to Honolulu, where it was
transcribed, translated into Japanese, lettered, and transmitted to Saipan
by “radiophoto” within two hours.
Japanese prisoners helped turn out leaflets and newspapers on OWI's
presses on Saipan.
The 17 members of the OWI staff on Saipan were challenged to a
previously unmatched degree. By mid-night on 11 August, less than
48 hours after Japan’s message was received in Washington, threequarters of a million leaflets giving notification of the surrender offer had
been printed on OWI’s three Webendorfer highspeed presses running
continually. By the next afternoon, production of OWI leaflet #2117 totaled
well over 5 million copies.
OWI did not have to work alone in this important effort. Saipan’s naval
base designated two 15-member Navy crews to pack the leaflets into
bomb casings for delivery. All bombing of Japan ceased while the Air Force
loaded the leaflets onto the B-29s of its 73rd Wing. Even Japanese
prisoners of war on Saipan volunteered. Realizing that the Japanese
military regime was on a suicidal course, some prisoners helped run the
presses for the leaflets in order to give accurate information to the
Japanese people. Eventually, they even offered to write copy, under OWI
supervision, for Allied newsprint distributions to Japan.
Loading OWI leaflets for transport to the US air field on Saipan, 1945
On 12 August, aircraft runs departed Saipan at 1:30, 4:30, 7:30 and 11:30
p.m., delivering to the people of Japan the news of their government’s
surrender offer. The 4” x 5” leaflets rained down by the millions, telling the
Japanese people:
These American planes are not dropping bombs on you today. American
planes are dropping these leaflets instead because the Japanese
Government has offered to surrender, and every Japanese has a right to
know the terms of that offer and the reply made to it by the United States
Government on behalf of itself, the British, the Chinese, and the Russians.
Your government now has a chance to end the war immediately. You will
see how the war can be ended by reading the two following official
statements.
Two paragraphs then gave the Japanese surrender offer verbatim and the
Byrnes response indicating the Allies’ willingness to accept that offer. OWI
repeated the same message continuously over station KSAI.
The significance of this information barrage cannot be overstated. For the
first time the Japanese people became aware that their government was
trying to surrender. And it was the first that Japanese officials knew of the
Allies’ acceptance of their surrender offer, because the OWI notification
preceded, by about 72 hours, the receipt of the official diplomatic reply
sent through Switzerland.
The Emperor’s Next Steps
Copies of the leaflet that fell on the palace grounds were immediately
taken to the Emperor by Marquis Kichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.
The Emperor realized that Japanese civilians now knew of the surrender
attempt and, more significantly, so did ordinary Japanese soldiers, sailors,
and airmen.
Fearing a military coup to ensure continuation of the war, the Emperor
decided to take additional action to bring the conflict to an end. On
13 August, when the Cabinet was called into immediate session, members
Anami Korechika, Umezo Yoshijir, and Toyoda Soemu unexpectedly
dissented anew, saying that an item in the original Potsdam proposal
stipulating that postwar Japan would ultimately be governed by the will of
the people was against Japanese tradition and therefore compliance was
impossible. This reversal precipitated another Imperial Conference at
which the Emperor stopped all argument by forcefully declaring that Japan
would accept the Potsdam conditions as modified in the 11 August
message from US Secretary of State Byrnes on behalf of the Allied
nations.
In an action without precedent, the Emperor decided to issue an Imperial
Rescript announcing the capitulation, to be delivered both to the Allies
through diplomatic channels and to his subjects in his own voice via radio
broadcast. The enormity of this decision must be understood in context:
the Emperor was considered a deity—no one was allowed to look upon him
from above, few citizens had seen him at all, and the Japanese people had
never before heard his voice. Hirohito well understood the powerful effect
his broadcast would have.
On 14 August, the Emperor made two recordings of the Rescript for
broadcast the next day. Aware that such a powerful communication would
doom efforts to continue the war, the military sent soldiers from a Tokyo
garrison to attack the Imperial Palace at night, imprison the Emperor, and
seize the recordings. They failed to turn up the recordings, however, which
had been secured at the radio station. Later that night, War Minister
Anami Korechika, having failed to promote his views and control his
soldiers, committed suicide, the first of many such actions in the days that
followed.
The Surrender Announcement
At noon on 15 August, a stunned population listened to Emperor Hirohito’s
high, shaking, unfamiliar voice announcing the final surrender of the
Japanese nation.
The world was jubilant. In New York, Times Square erupted in a sea of
celebrating humanity. In Naples, a USO Andrews Sisters show was
completely disrupted as the war-weary soldiers, about to embark from
Europe for the Pacific, heard the announcement and realized that their trip
would be cancelled. In a prison camp near Tokyo, an American, expecting
yet another beating, was handed a paper cup of sake wine and his smiling
captor informed him that the war was over.
On Saipan, OWI staff members had little time to savor the moment. They
were already hard at work producing leaflets of instruction for the
surrendering Japanese on the homeland islands and subsequently in
Manchuria, China, New Guinea, and the Philippines.
Washington’s Gratitude
Secretary of State Byrnes lost no time in thanking the OWI staff in
Honolulu and Saipan. A dispatch from Washington dated 17 August 1945,
sent through OWI’s Bradford Smith in Honolulu, reads:
I have been requested by Secretary Byrnes to send appreciation to everyone
concerned for the magnificent work done in lettering, translating, printing,
sending, and distributing the important leaflet directly before the surrender of
Japan. It is the belief of Secretary Byrnes as well as we in this office that the
factor which helped to bring about the final surrender was this leaflet. We would
appreciate your passing this along to everyone concerned including Hubert
[Chief of the Forward Area], Air Force personnel, Psychological Warfare and all
those in the OWI who are well deserving of congratulations for the superb job.
On 2 September, formal instruments of surrender were signed by Japanese
officials on behalf of the Emperor and by Allied officials on behalf of the
governments of the United States, the Republic of China, the United
Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Commonwealth of
Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Dominion of Canada, the
Provisional Government of the French Republic, and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
Although OWI continued to handle its national affairs through its
headquarters in Washington until 12 March 1946, its overseas operations
began to wind down after Japan’s surrender. On 7 September 1945,
oversight of the forward area on Saipan was transferred to the United
States Information Service; OWI’s Honolulu office closed on 31 October
1945. Chief of the Forward Area, Richard Hubert, returning to Washington,
reflected the sentiment of many on his staff:
It is an honor and privilege to have served with the Office of War Information,
which agency deserves more credit than public opinion may ever realize.
Operating abroad in secrecy, it is undoubtedly so that the Axis know more about
the OWI operations than our own citizens.
These words rang true for years, but finally the story of OWI’s important
role in the final days of the war in the Pacific can be told.
Footnotes:
1The Office of War Information was established by President Roosevelt on
13 June 1942, under Executive Order 9182, “in recognition of the right of the
American people and of all other peoples opposing the Axis agressors to
be truthfully informed about the common war effort.” Subsequent
Executive Orders empowered OWI to conduct such propaganda abroad as
would contribute to victory. For additional information, see: “Statement of
Secretary of State Byrnes to the House Appropriations Sub-committee,”
Congressional Record, 19 February 1946.
2 Bradford Smith reported that “During the first week of operation, four B29s which otherwise would have been lost were returned to base through
the use of the station. By April, more than 20 had been saved.” Personal
papers at the University of Vermont Library, p. 18. See also, letter of
12 August 1945 from Nathan F. Twining, Lt. Gen. US Army, to R. S. R.
Hubert, OWI Chief, Saipan: “Your staying on the air throughout the entire
day has served a two-fold purpose: first, the long range radio homing
facility has greatly facilitated navigation on our combat missions and,
secondly, the programs have been a great help to the morale of combat
crews participating in these operations.”
3 Richard S. R. Hubert, “The OWI Saipan Operation,” Official Report to US
Information Service, Washington, 1946, charts pp. 88-89.
4 Bradford Smith, “Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda in Japan,” pp. 21-
22. Personal papers at the University of Vermont Library.
5 The effectiveness of the leaflets was indelibly established in the minds
of Company B of the 381st Infantry on Okinawa when a pretty young girl
surrendered to them stark naked. She had misinterpreted the wording,
which instructed men to come out stripped to the waist and women to
“come as they are.” Stars and Stripes, 29 June 1945.
6 As early as 10 March 1945, Japan's War Minister Sugiyama Gen had
declared that, “The enemy invasion of our homeland is imminent.” Daily
Digest of Tokyo Radio, OWI Overseas Branch, San Francisco.
7 China’s Chiang Kai-shek participated in the Potsdam discussions by wire
communication.
8 World War II Surrender Documents: Japan Surrenders 1945, National Archives
and Records Service, Washington, DC, 1976.
9 As reported by Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori in his book, The Cause of
Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p. 313. Japanese broadcasts,
apparently in response to the leaflet campaign, contrasted Germany’s
alleged lack of resolve under aerial siege with that of Japan, noting that,
“Orientals are made of sterner stuff.” As quoted in the Philadelphia Inquirer
& Public Ledger, 5 August 1945.
10 Newsweek, 6 August 1945, p. 25.
11 The Daily Target, Saipan, vol. II, no. 92, 7 August 1945.
12 OWI Daily Digest, series 7, no. 46, 23 August 1945.
13 Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1977), p. 103.
14 See, for example, Robert Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Hoover
Library Publication: Stanford University Press, 1954).
15 Ibid, pp. 189 ff.
16 The USSR briefly withheld approval, hoping to gain veto power over the
designation of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
Josette H. Williams is a freelance writer and editor. Her article draws on US
government records and the personal papers of her father, a senior official
with the Office of War Information.
The views, opinions and findings of the author expressed in this article should
not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its
factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of
any component of the United States government.